How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican Small-Scale Fishing Community

The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin’s model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their fishing grounds. Using insights from common- pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls.

Migration and fishing in Indonesian coastal villages.

The coastal ecosystems in Southeast Asia are under increased pressure from local and global change. This paper examines human migration and the use of marine resources in coastal villages in the Minahasa district of North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Primary data were collected through interviews with village leaders, focus groups, and a sample survey of 600 fishing households. Migration is responsible for at least one quarter of the total growth during the past decade. All groups of fishermen report falling productivity of the nearshore fisheries. Econometric analysis is used to examine the weekly fish catch of the artisanal fishing sector. Migration status and socioeconomic variables seem to have no systematic effect, while fishing effort (labor, boat, and gear), the degree of specialization, and the remoteness of villages are found to be positively related to weekly fish catches.

The dynamic efficiency costs of common-pool resource exploitation

We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies.